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Congress Stopped Short in Amending the 
Law of Venue in Patent Infringement Cases: 
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 
In 1988, Congress redefined the term "reside" in the gener- 
al venue statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c),* as it applies to corpo- 
rate defendants. In VE Holding Corp. u. Johnson Gas Appli- 
ance CO.,~ this new definition was applied to a corporate defen- 
dant in patent infringement suit by reading the definition into 
the patent venue ~ t a tu t e .~  By applying the definition to corpo- 
rations in patent infringement cases, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit changed the 100 year-old basis for appropri- 
ate venue in patent infringement cases from the jurisdiction 
where the defendant resides to where personal jurisdiction may 
be ~btained.~ 
The major argument in favor of applying the new defini- 
tion t o  patent infringement cases is to bring the venue provi- 
sions in patent infringement cases "more in line with venue 
law generally, as well as with other types of patent litigation.'" 
Although the 1988 amendment of the general venue statute as 
interpreted in VE Holding did make the law of venue in patent 
cases more consistent with venue laws generally, Congress 
should have repealed the patent venue statute, thereby placing 
all types of patent litigation under the general venue statute. 
Because the 1988 amendment to  the general venue statute is 
expressly limited to corporations, the repeal of the patent ven- 
ue statute is necessary t o  eliminate the inconsistencies that 
now exist in patent venue litigation. 
Consequently, this note analyzes how venue law in patent 
infringement cases has changed as a result of the interpreta- 
tion given in VE Holding and discusses the practical effects of 
1. 28 U.S.C. 8 1391(c) (1988). A corporate defendant is "deemed to reside in 
any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the 
action is commenced." Id. 
2. 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991). 
3. 28 U.S.C. 8 140000) (1988). 
4. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1575. 
5. Id. at 1583-84. 
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those changes. More specifically, this note examines the incon- 
sistencies and problems resulting from Congress's decision to 
make only part of the law of venue in patent cases consistent 
with general venue law.6 The note concludes that, in order to 
make venue law in patent cases consistent with general venue 
law, Congress should repeal the patent venue statute. 
Appropriate venue for patent infringement cases, as now 
set forth in 28 U.S.C. 5 1400(b),7 has remained virtually un- 
changed for nearly 100 years.8 In Fourco Glass Co. u. 
Transmirra Products Corp.: the Supreme Court held that 
5 1400(b) was the exclusive venue statute for patent infringe- 
ment cases.10 Under § 1400(b) venue is appropriate in patent 
infringement cases when either of two tests is met: (1) the 
defendant resides in the judicial district, or ( 2 )  "the defendant 
has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business."" This section continues t o  gov- 
ern patent infringement cases notwithstanding the general 
venue statute codified in 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(c).12 
Prior to VE Holding, the term "resides" as applied to a 
corporate defendant in the first prong of § 1400(b) meant the 
defendant's state of incorporation only.13 At the time Fourco 
was decided, 5 1391(c) stated that a "corporation may be sued 
in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to 
do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall 
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue pur- 
pose~.'''~ The plaintiffs in Fourco argued that 5 1391(c) 
supplemented the provisions in 5 1400(b) and that the defen- 
dant could be sued where it was doing business, not just the 
6. Id. at 1584 (stating that the result of the change "is not a result so absurd 
that Congress could not possibly have intended it"). 
7. 28 U.S.C. $ 1400(b) (1988). 
8. VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t  1575. 
9. 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957). 
10. See also Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (hold- 
ing that 28 U.S.C. $ 109 (1940) was the exclusive provision controlling venue in 
patent cases). When 28 U.S.C. $ 109 was recodified as 28 U.S.C. $ 1400@) in 
1948, no substantial changes were made. 
11. 28 U.S.C. $ 1400(b) (1988). 
12. Fourco, 353 US. at 229. 
13. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991). 
14. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 223 (quoting 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c) (1952)). 
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state of incorporation.15 The Court, however, rejected this ar- 
gument and held that 5 1391(c) did not supplement the specific 
venue provisions of 5 1400(b).16 
After receiving pressure from the bar and the courts," 
Congress amended 5 1391(c) in 1988 and thereby introduced 
two significant changes.18 The first change affected how the 
general venue statute of 5 1391(c) applies to other sections in 
the chapter. Section 1391(c) now begins with the phrase, "For 
purposes of venue under this chapter. . . ."lg Because 
3 1400(b) is within the same chapter as 5 1391(c), the 1988 
amendment applies to  5 1400(b) as well. The second change 
involved the remaining language of 1391(c), which now states 
that "a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to re- 
side in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is ~ommenced."~~ In VE 
Holding2' the Federal Circuit considered the effect of these 
two changes on the patent venue provisions in 6 1400(b). 
111. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 
A. The Facts 
VE Holding Corporation filed suit in federal district court 
in the Northern District of California against Johnson Gas 
Appliance Company, alleging "direct and contributory infringe- 
ment of and inducement to infringe" patents held by VE Hold- 
ing.22 Johnson Gas moved to dismiss the case for improper 
venue, arguing it was "an Iowa corporation with no regular and 
established place af business" in California, and venue was 
therefore not proper under 6 1400(b).~~ 
The district court held that Johnson Gas did not "reside" in 
California as required under the old interpretation of the term 
"reside" in 5 1400(b).~~ The district court also found that John- 
15. Id. at 223-24. 
16. Id. at 228-29. 
17. For a discussion of the confusion courts encountered interpreting 5 1391(c), 
see Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 195 F. Supp. 528, 530 (W.D.S.C. 1961), rev'd, 
301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961). 
18. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578. 
19. 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c) (1988). 
20. Id. 
21. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1579. 
22. Id. at 1576. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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son Gas did not have a regular and established place of busi- 
ness in California as required by 8 1400(b), and dismissed the 
case for improper venue.25 However, because Johnson Gas 
conceded that personal jurisdiction was proper in California, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held 
that venue was proper in the Northern District of C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  
B. The Court's Reasoning 
The Federal Circuit stated that VE Holding was a case of 
first impression because the 1988 amendment made $ 1391(c) 
applicable to the entire venue chapter, whereas the issue was 
open to interpretation when it was last considered in Four~o.~ '  
Upon examining the statute, the court held that 8 1391(c) 
should be applied to 1400(b), reasoning that where the lan- 
guage is clear, the plain meaning of the statute is conclu- 
sive." The court found no exceptions to the plain meaning 
rule because there was no specific legislative history indicating 
that § 1391(c) should not apply to 1400(b),29 while evidence 
did exist that Congress was aware that the change would apply 
to the entire chapter.30 
The court also addressed the argument that 5 1400(b) 
nullified 9 1391(:c) because $ 1400(b) is a specific statute, 
whereas 8 1391(c) is only a general statute. The court conclud- 
ed that the general statute, 9 1391(c), governed because 
§ 1391(c') expressly defines the remainder of the chapter includ- 
ing § 1400(b).31 The court further reasoned that applying 
$ 1391(c) to $ 1400(b) would "bring the law of venue in patent 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1584. 
27. Id. at 1579. Prior to the 1988 amendment, it  was uncertain whether the 
two sections should be read together because of 8 1391(c)'s nonspecific language. 
However, the section now specifically states, "For purposes of venue under this 
chapter . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
28. VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t  1579. 
29. Id. a t  1580. See also Alan B. Rich et al., The Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act: New Patent Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More, 5 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 311, 315-20 (1990) (legislative history indicates that § 1391(c) should 
apply to § 1400(b)); Neil A. Smith, Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Practice: A 
Tipping of the Scales, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, SECURING AND ENFORCING 
PATENT RIGHTS (1990), available in Westlaw, C567 ALI-ABA 397, a t  *17. 
30. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1581-82. See also Rich et  al., supra note 29, a t  
317-20 (tracing the amendment in its travels through congressional subcommittees 
where explicit language stated the amendment applied to all of Chapter 87, the 
venue chapter). 
31. VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t  1580. 
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cases more in line with venue law generally,7732 a result the 
court characterized as "not. . . so absurd that Congress could 
not possibly have intended it."33 The court concluded by hold- 
ing that the first test for venue under § 1400(b) for a corporate 
defendant is whether the corporation is subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.34 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The amendment of 3 1391(c) brought only part of the pat- 
ent venue statute more in line with venue law generally be- 
cause the amendment applies only to corporations. The result 
of the amendment will be that non-corporate defendants in- 
volved in patent litigation will be treated differently for pur- 
pose of venue than corporate defendants. In cases involving 
corporate defendants, collateral litigation over what constitutes 
proper venue will shift to a battle over what constitutes person- 
al jurisdiction. Such a result may be desirable; however, in 
cases involving non-corporate defendants, collateral litiga- 
t i ~ n ~ ~  over proper venue will continue. To remedy this prob- 
lem, Congress should repeal § 1400(b). 
In support of the argument to repeal 9 1400(b), this section 
will analyze the effects of the new definition of "reside" in the 
general venue statute and show the inconsistencies between 
the treatment of corporate and non-corporate defendants. The 
effects of the change on individual defendants, partnerships, 
and corporations in patent litigation will be analyzed by focus- 
ing on the breadth of the change in relation t o  the old statute 
through several examples. Finally, a possible solution to the 
issues raised in the analysis will be proposed. 
A. Effects on Individuals 
The change in § 1391(:c) has no effect on individual defen- 
dants because Congress redefined the term "resides" only as it 
applies to corporations. Thus, 5 1400(b) is not superfluous and 
remains applicable to individuals under Fourco's rea~oning.~~ 
32. Id. at 1583. 
33. Id. at 1584. 
34. Id. 
35. The court in VE Holding implied that Congress wanted the venue law for 
patent infringement cases to become more liberalized. The court never mentioned,' 
however, whether Congress understood what effects this could have on collateral 
litigation. See id. at  1582-83. 
36. See Appellant's Brief at  27-28, VE Holding (Nos. 90-1270, 90-1274) (noting 
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Under 5 1400(b), venue is proper for an individual defendant 
where that defendant resides, or where the defendant has com- 
mitted acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.s7 Because the change in 5 1391(c) is limited 
t o  corporations, the extensive collateral litigations8 regarding 
proper venue over individuals will continue. 
The amendment of 5 1391(c) also failed to change an incon- 
sistency that exists in venue law for individual defendants in 
declaratory judgment actionss9 and patent infringement ac- 
tions. Unlike a patent infringement action, 5 1400(b) is not 
controlling in a declaratory judgment action involving an in- 
dividual defendant.40 The amendment did change this incon- 
sistency with respect t o  corporate defendants, but failed to 
remedy the problem with individual defendants. 
Finally, by exempting individuals from litigating where 
corporations are required to  litigate, individuals are given an 
unfair economic advantage because individuals are not forced 
to defend in as many forums as corporations. As one commen- 
tator noted, "[Llimiting venue to the forum most convenient to 
the alleged infringer is contrary to recent Supreme Court pro- 
nouncements on personal jurisdiction, the spirit of which apply 
with equal force t o  patent venue.'"' 
that the district court erred in concluding that a portion of § 1400(b) is superflu- 
ous because the change in the definition of "resides" only applies to corporations); 
Smith, supra note 29, at *17 (noting that § 1391(c) applies only to corporate defen- 
dants and 1400(b) is still applicable to natural persons). 
37. 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (1988). 
38. See VE Holding, 917 F.2d at  1583 n.19; see also Richard C. Wydick, Venue 
in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 566-85 (1973). 
39. A declaratory judgment action is the mirror image of a suit for patent in- 
fringement. This action is commenced by an alleged infringer to declare a patent is 
invalid or not infringed before the patent holder sues for infringement. 
40. See United States Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer Co., 694 F.2d 193, 195 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that for declaratory judgment actions, 1391(c) of the general 
venue statute applies rather than § 1400(b)); see also Michael L. Keller & K e ~ e t h  
J. N u ~ e n k a m p ,  Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit During 1990, 40 A M .  U. L. REV. 1157, 1193 (1991). 
41. Keller & N u ~ e n k a m p ,  supra note 40, at  1194. 
[Wlhere individuals 'purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate adiv- 
ities, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in 
other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities; 
the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield 
to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985) (citation omitted). 
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B. Effects on Partnerships 
In Injection Research Specialists u. Polaris Industrie~?~ 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
held that partnerships are to  be treated as corporations for 
purposes of venue under 55 1391(c) and 1400(b).~~ Thus, VE 
Holding may well apply to both partnership and corporate 
 defendant^.^^ Injection Research gives additional support to 
the proposition that non-corporate defendants should not be 
treated differently than corporate defendants for purposes of 
venue. 
C. Effects on Corporations 
For corporations involved in patent infringement actions, 
the venue requirements are now the same as the general venue 
law for corporations; venue is proper where personal jurisdic- 
tion can be obtained at the time the action is commenced. In 
relation to the old patent venue statute, however, a significant 
change has occurred only in the area concerning additional 
venue districts. The only additional districts for proper venue 
under VE Holding are those districts where the defendant's 
contacts with the forum have the necessary nexus for personal 
jurisdiction, or where the defendant's contacts can be charac- 
terized as continuous and systematic general business con- 
t a c t ~ . ~ ~  
Under Fourco's reasoning, venue was proper in (1) the 
state of incorporation, or (2) where the defendant had commit- 
ted acts of infringement and had a regular and established 
place of business.46 With the decision in VE Holding, the new 
definitioo of "reside" does not alter the second, "regular and 
established place of business" test in 1400(:b). However, by 
redefining "reside" in 5 1391(c) to allow venue where personal 
jurisdiction may be found, the f i s t  venue test under 5 1400(b), 
as modified by 5 1391(c), has swallowed up the second, "regular 
42. 759 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Colo. 1991). 
43. Id. at 1513. 
44. However, this issue has not yet been addressed by the Federal Circuit 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. 
45. See Plastic Films, Inc. v. Poly Pak Am., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 
(W.D. Mich. 1991). 
46. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1577-78 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991). 
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and established place of business" test, because personal juris- 
diction is always obtained where the defendant has committed 
acts of inffingement and has a regular and established place of 
business.47 The second "regular and established place of 
business" test in 8 1400(b) is superfluous for corporations. 
Thus, proper venue under VE Holding incorporates all 
proper venue districts under Fourco and adds one additional 
area. This area includes districts where personal jurisdiction 
can be obtained outside the state of incorporation or outside of 
the forum where the defendant had committed acts of infringe- 
ment and has a regular and established place of business. To 
obtain personal jurisdiction in one of these new districts, the 
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be character- 
ized as continuous and systematic general business contacts 
(general juri~diction),~' or include a "nexus between the 
plaintiffs alleged injury, the production, selling, or use of an 
article infringing its patent . . . , and the defendant's con- 
(specific jurisd~tion).~~ These contacts are necessary to  
meet due process  consideration^.^^ 
In short, the results of the amendment are twofold for a 
corporation involved in patent litigation. First, collateral litiga- 
tion over what constitutes proper venue will shift to a battle 
47. See Plastic Films, 764 F. Supp. a t  1241 (holding that there must be a nec- 
essary "nexus between the plaintiff's alleged injury, the production, selling, or use 
of an article infringing its patent, see 35 U.S.C. $ 271, and the defendant's con- 
duct*); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). The district court in 
VE Holding noted that the second "regular and established place of business" test 
in $ 1400(b) was superfluous with the amendment of $ 1391(c) because personal 
jurisdiction is always obtained if the conditions in the first test of $ 1400(b), as 
modified by $1391(c), are met. Appellant's Brief at 27-28, VE Holding (Nos. 90- 
1270, 90-1274). 
48. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) 
(finding that general jurisdiction did not exist where the activities were not regular 
and systematic and the action did not arise out of contacts with the state); Perkins 
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (finding general jurisdiction 
even though the claims were unrelated to local activities since the defendant's 
contacts were characterized as continuous and systematic general business con- 
tacts). 
49. Plastic Films, 764 F. Supp. at 1241 (citation omitted). 
50. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at  204 (personal jurisdiction exists if the controversy 
arises out of, or is related to, defendant's contacts with the forum). 
51. In addition to the constitutional due process requirements, a state long-arm 
statute is needed for personal jurisdiction in these cases. For example, in Utah, 
statutory authority is obtained in a patent infringement suit by the state's long- 
arm statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over a party that causes a tortious 
injury. See In re Traveler's Club Luggage, Inc., 935 F.2d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (un- 
published opinion), available in LEXIS & Westlaw databases. 
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over personal jurisdiction, while collateral litigation over what 
constitutes proper venue will still continue for individuals. 
Second, venue choices for a corporate defendant are potentially 
greater than for a non-corporate defendant. The shift in collat- 
eral litigation creates a disparity between corporate and non- 
corporate defendants because a corporate defendant must liti- 
gate under well-established personal jurisdiction precedent, 
while a non-corporate defendant must litigate under the con- 
fusing "regular and established business" standard in 
5 1400(b).~"ecause of this disparity and because of the in- 
creased forums now available to a corporate defendant, 
5 1400(b) should be repealed. 
D. Examples 
A few examples illustrate how venue law in patent in- 
fringement cases has changed and how certain inconsistencies 
have been produced. 
1. Shifting collateral litigation and disparities in potential 
forums 
a. Hypothetical. A manufacturing company incorporated 
in Illinois with its principal place of business in Chicago occa- 
sionally purchases replacement parts from a Houston company. 
Employees sometimes travel to Houston for training on how to 
install these replacement parts. The part is used in a device 
that allegedly infringes the plaintiffs patent. The plaintiff lives 
in Texas and would like to sue for infringement in Texas. Ven- 
ue is proper in Texas under International Shoe Co. u. Washing- 
tons3 and its progeny if the plaintiff can show the necessary 
nexus between this replacement part, the defendant's contacts 
with Texas, and the infringement of the plaintiffs patent. 
If, however, this part was not used in the production of the 
device that allegedly infringed the plaintiffs patent, then venue 
in Texas would be proper only if the plaintiff could obtain gen- 
eral jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiff would be required to show 
that the defendant's business contacts with Texas were contin- 
uous and systematic general business contacts. 
Under the old interpretation of 5 1400(b), venue would not 
be proper in Texas because the company is not incorporated in 
52. See infra part IV.D.3. 
53. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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Texas, and it did not infringe the plaintiffs patent in Texas. 
Thus, under the old interpretation of 8 1400(b), the defendant 
corporation would probably choose to litigate the venue issue 
rather than the jurisdictional question because the defendant 
could easily win and would not have to  litigate in Texas. How- 
ever, with the new statute, the defendant corporation would 
now choose to fight the jurisdictional question t o  avoid being 
required to  defend a suit in Texas. 
This example illustrates that in the case of a corporation, 
collateral litigation will be centered on personal jurisdiction 
rather than on the venue requirements in 5 1400(b), and that 
increased venue choices are now available to a corporation 
under the amendment. 
b. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. VE 
Holding also demonstrates how the focus of a corporate 
defendant's collateral litigation over the proper forum shifts 
from venue to personal jurisdiction with the new interpretation 
of "resides" in 5 1400(b). In VE Holding, Johnson Gas, an Iowa 
corporation with no regular and established place of business 
in California, was sued in the Northern District of California. 
Even though the second prong of § 140qb) requiring the defen- 
dant to commit acts of infringement and have a regular and 
established place of business was not met, venue was proper 
because Johnson Gas admitted personal jurisdiction in Califor- 
nia.54 However, if Johnson Gas had not conceded personal ju- 
risdiction and if no personal jurisdiction were found, then the 
result under the new statute would be identical to  the result 
under the old statute. The case would have been dismissed for 
improper venue. 
If Johnson Gas had not admitted personal jurisdiction, 
then VE Holding would have been forced to prove that under 
the new statute personal jurisdiction existed in California over 
Johnson Gas. Thus, the result of the new statute is to shift the 
collateral litigation from determining proper venue to the exis- 
tence of personal jurisdiction. 
c. Ross v. Tuerk. Ross u. ~ u e r k ~ ~  is an example of how 
the amendment of § 1391(c) may allow a corporate defendant a 
greater choice of forums than a non-corporate defendant. In 
54. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990), c u t .  denied, 111 S. Ct 1315 (1991). 
55. 923 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion), available in LEXIS & 
Westlaw databases. 
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Tuerk, Ross filed a patent infringement action in the District of 
Maryland against a corporation, Aero, and its president, Tuerk. 
Venue was not proper for Tuerk under the first test of 
5 1400(b) because Tuerk was an individual and not domiciled 
in Maryland.56 Venue for the corporation would be proper only 
if it were subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland. 
Aero was not incorporated in Maryland, nor did it have a 
manufacturing or sales office there. Based on these facts, the 
Federal Circuit remanded the case to determine whether Aero 
was subject to personal jurisdi~tion.~? Tuerk demonstrates 
that in some cases venue may not be proper for the president of 
a corporation under 8 1400(b), but may be proper for the corpo- 
ration under 3 1391(c). Such an inconsistency should be elimi- 
nated by repealing 3 1400(b). 
2. Limited effects of the amendment 
Price v. Code-Alarm, I ~ c . ~ '  illustrates the limited effects 
of the change in $ 1391(c) because venue in Code-Alarm would 
have been proper under either the old or the new interpreta- 
tion of § 1400(b). In Code-Alarm, Price brought an action in 
Illinois against Code-Alarm for contributory infringement of 
Price's patent for an automatic burglar alarm.59 Code-Alarm, 
a Michigan corporation that made and sold security devices for 
vehicles, admitted it maintained a continuous and regular place 
of business in I l l i n~ i s .~~  Code-Alarm had twenty distributor 
and retail customers selling Code-Alarm devices in Illin~is.~' 
Even though Code-Alarm was argued after the decision in 
VE Holding, the defendant asserted that venue was improper 
based on the old interpretation of § 1400(b) because it was not 
incorporated in Illinois? The court refused to abandon VE 
Holding, finding that venue was proper because Code-Alarm 
had sufficient contacts in Illinois to  deem it a "resident" of the 
state." The court then held that venue was also proper under 
the old interpretation of 3 1400(b), because Code-Alarm met the 
56. Id. Since Tuerk was an individual, Fourco reasoning still applies. Tuerk 
would have to be domiciled in Maryland to "reside" there. 
57. Id. 
58. No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9620 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
59. Id. at *l. 
60. Id. at *2. 
61. Id. at *l. 
62. Id. at *2. 
63. Id. at *7. 
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requirements of "the second, 'regular and established place of 
business' prong" of the test.64 Because Code-Alarm admitted 
to having a continuous and regular presence in I l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~  ven- 
ue was proper under either interpretation. 
Code-Alarm demonstrates that the effects of the amend- 
ment of $ 1391(c) will be somewhat limited because a defen- 
dant who meets the requirements for personal jurisdiction will 
often meet the requirements of 8 1400(b). Because of the over- 
lap, the existence of $ 1400(b) only serves to create confusion 
and i t  should be repealed. 
3. Simplification of collateral litigation 
I n  re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter 
Patent ~ i t i g a t i o n ~ ~  demonstrates how the new interpretation 
of 8 1400(b) can make a significant difference in determining 
proper venue. The defendant in Mahurkar, an Arizona compa- 
ny with its principal place of business in Arizona, was sued in 
11linois.~~ Although the defendant had two sales representa- 
tives and two technicians in Illinois, it contended that this did 
not constitute a " 'regular and established place of business' " in 
the state and thus venue was impr0per.6~ The district court 
declined to decide if the defendant had a "regular and estab- 
lished place of business" in Illinois under the second prong of 
$ 1400(b) because, under VE Holding, venue was appropriate. 
The court held that the defendant's contacts with Illinois were 
enough to give rise to personal jurisdiction." 
In Mahurkar, the difficult question of whether the defen- 
dant met the second prong of 8 1400(b) was avoided because 
personal jurisdiction obviously existed and venue was clearly 
proper in Illinois. Even though venue may be proper under 
either statute, venue may be more easily proven under 
$ 1391(c),~O making the provisions of 5 1400(b) unnecessary. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. 750 I?. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
67. Id. at 333. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 334. The defendant agreed that enough contacts existed for personal 
jurisdiction. 
70. See also In re Traveler's Club Luggage, Inc., 935 F.2d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(unpublished opinion), available. in LEXIS & Westlaw databases (finding venue 
proper after determining that there was statutory authority for personal jurisdic- 
tion in the state long-arm statute, and that there were sufficient "minimum con- 
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Thus, to  simplify collateral litigation for non-corporate defen- 
dants, § 1400tb) should be repealed. 
E. Possible Effects of Changing the Venue Statute 
As several examples have shown, the effects resulting from 
the amendment of § 1391(c) may not have been those desired 
by Congress. For example, the result of Congress's attempt t o  
"bring the law of venue in patent cases more in line with venue 
law generally"" may be that collateral litigation involving cor- 
porate defendants will merely shift from venue litigation to  
litigation over personal jurisdiction, focusing in some cases on 
whether a plaintiff can obtain specific or general personal juris- 
d i ~ t i o n . ~ W n  the other hand, litigation for proper venue in- 
volving a non-corporate defendant will often be determined by 
whether a "regular and established place of business" exists in 
the forum.73 
Ironically, a major argument for eliminating the special 
venue statute for patent cases is that wasteful collateral litiga- 
tion over proper venue would be eliminated.74 A 1968 Ameri- 
can Law Institute study on jurisdiction found: 
Any venue statute that produces a large volume of litigation 
on where suit may be brought is inherently suspect . . . . 
Though a broadening of venue choices increases the opportu- 
nities for forum shopping, an activity not unknown in patent 
cases, this is not too high a price to pay for having a single 
venue rule for federal question cases, and for putting an end 
to wasteful litigation about proper venue.?5 
This argument remains valid for non-corporate defendants for 
whom collateral litigation over proper venue will still continue 
under the confusing standard in § 1400(b). 
tacts" as required by the Constitution); Farberware Inc. v. Alternative Pioneering 
Sys., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (using new interpretation of 
$ 1391(c) to find proper venue after the state's long-arm statute for personal juris- 
diction was satisfied). 
71. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S .  Ct. 1513 (1991). 
72. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
73. See also Wydick, supra note 38, at 566-85 (discussing the amount of litiga- 
tion produced in attempting to determine what constitutes a "regular and estab- 
lished place of business"). 
74. Keller & Nunnenkamp, supra note 40, a t  1189. 
75. A.L.I., STXJDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED- 
ERAL COURTS 221 (1969). 
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Some may argue that repealing the patent venue statute 
would merely shift wasteful collateral litigation from venue to 
personal jurisdiction. As noted in VE Holding, "At least until 
now, questions of personal jurisdiction rarely arose in simple 
patent infringement cases because the venue statute was, com- 
paratively, severely more restrictive concerning districts in 
which suit could be brought."76 Even so, the shift from litiga- 
tion over proper venue to personal jurisdiction may be desirable 
because of the prevalent Supreme Court precedent for personal 
jurisdiction. This shift may simplify and reduce collateral liti- 
gation. 
F. Repealing $1400(b)-A Possible Solution 
To bring the law of venue in patent cases more in line with 
venue law in general, Congress should repeal 8 1400(b).~~ By
repealing !$ 1400(b), confusion in the lower courts about how to 
apply the decision in VE Holding would be eliminated,78 thus 
promoting judicial economy. The issue of whether a partnership 
76. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at  1583 11.20 (citation omitted); see also Ferber v. 
Eastern Newsstand Corp., No. 89 CV 1362 (TCP), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16151 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). Ferber was filed before the decision in VE Holding. After the 
decision in VE Holding, the court dismissed the case for improper venue. The 
defendant had previously waived its objection to personal jurisdiction, evidently 
planning to challenge the venue issue under the old 3 1391(c). After VE Holding, 
this strategy was fruitless. 
77. See Wydick, supra note 38, at 584 (With the enactment of liberalized gen- 
eral venue laws, the patent venue statute has long since outlived its original pur- 
pose. The continued existence of the patent venue statute serves only to prolong 
patent litigation and make it more expensive."); see also CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AM) PROCEDURE $ 3823, at  215 (1990), quoted in VE Holding, 
917 F.2d at 1583 (" 'The statute [$ 1400(b)] ought to be repealed, and patent cases 
treated in the same fashion as federal question cases generally.' "). 
The American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright 
Law in its annual meeting on August 4, 1990 initially stated it favored the repeal 
of 28 U.S.C. 3 140000). This resolution, however, was withdrawn until the Section 
of Antitrust Law reviewed i t  to see whether there would be any anti-competitive 
effects if the statute were repealed. Brian E. Banner, Commitfee Reports to be 
Presented at  the Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADE- 
MARK & COPY RIG^ L. REP. 19. 
78. See Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). In this case the 
court chose to examine whether venue was proper under the second prong of 
$ 1400(b) instead of considering whether the defendant was subject to personal 
jurisdiction. The court found no "regular and established place of business," and 
concluded that venue was not proper. A simpler analysis would consider whether 
the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction. Since the complaint was de- 
void of any allegations that the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction, 
the court could have decided immediately that venue was not proper. 
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should be considered a corporation for purposes of determining 
venue would also be eliminated.79 Further, non-corporate de- 
feidants would need to meet the same requirements as corpo- 
rations in patent infringement cases, and in all other civil cas- 
es, for purposes of venue. Such a requirement for individual 
defendants is desirable in light of the Supreme Court's view 
that individuals who benefit from their interstate activities 
should be accountable in the areas where they derive their 
benefit.80 Further, the inconsistency in venue law involving 
declaratory judgment actions and patent infringement cases 
would be eliminated for non-corporate defendants." Finally, 
repealing $ 1400(b) would not be a drastic change because the 
amendment of 8 1391(c) has not greatly expanded the number 
of potential forums?' 
Even though collateral litigation would still continue over 
proper venue, the litigation would be focused on personal juris- 
diction and would be essentially the same as for all other civil 
cases. Well-established Supreme Court precedent already exists 
for personal jurisdiction, which would simplify litigation. 
Repealing $ 1400(b) would also allow Congress to clearly 
state its intent about the future of patent litigation instead of 
having the federal courts try to determine Congress's intent.83 
A clear statement of congressional intent will enhance the 
ability of courts to make correct decisions and will promote 
judicial economy. 
At least one commentator has argued that the special pat- 
ent venue should not be repealed, claiming that a repeal "is un- 
likely t o  strengthen the patent system, is likely to lead to abus- 
es that may add fuel to the anti-patent forces about us, and 
will generate more forum shopping and more transfer re- 
q u e s t ~ . " ~ ~  This argument against repealing the special venue 
statute has now been undermined with the amendment of 
$ 139 I (C) .~~  Also the opportunities for forum shopping generat- 
79. See Price v. Code-Alarm Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9620 
(N.D. Ill. 1991). 
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. . 
81. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra parts IV.C, IV.D.2. 
83. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S .  Ct. 1315 (1991) (analyzing with difficulty past 
congressional intent concerning the restriction or liberalization of patent venue 
law). 
84. Neal A. Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. 140qb) Should Not 
Be Repealed, 4 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N 32, 55 (1976). 
85. Waldrop's main argument for not repealing 5 1400(b) is that the alleged 
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ed by a repeal of $ 1400(b) may not be too high a price to pay 
to end wasteful collateral l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Similarly, venue trans- 
fer requests are more easily resolved than litigating over prop- 
er venue because courts may deny transfers if venue is improp- 
er in the transferee court or if the convenience of the parties 
does not warrant a transfer in the interest of justice.87 
By amending the general venue statute as it applies to 
corporations, venue law in patent infringement cases has con- 
formed somewhat to venue law in general. The lack of complete 
uniformity arises because the statute only applies to corpora- 
infringer has purposely been given a broader range of forums in which to bring a 
declaratory judgment action declaring the patent invalid and unenforceable than 
the patent holder in an infringement suit. This advantage was given to the alleged 
infringer because the patent holder could become oppressive in trying to sue al- 
leged infringers if the patent holder in an infringement action could always obtain 
favorable forums in which to litigate. If $ 14006) were repealed, the alleged in- 
fringer would lose this advantage. Id. at 50. 
This argument is now undermined with the amendment of $ 1391(c) and the 
decision in VE Holding because corporations are now treated the same in both 
patent infringement cases and declaratory judgment actions for purposes of venue. 
The amendment does not affect individuals, so Waldrop's reasoning still applies for 
an individual that is an alleged infringer involved in a declaratory judgment ac- 
tion. 
Even though no inconsistency now exists between the venue requirements for 
corporate defendants involved in either a declaratory judgment action or a patent 
infringement action, $ 14006) should still be repealed to bring non-corporate defen- 
dants on the same footing as corporate defendants. Presently, if an individual de- 
fendant is sued for patent infringement, he or she is subject to the venue require- 
ments of $ 140O(b). However, if an individual is sued in a declaratory judgment 
action, then the general venue requirements found in $ 1391(c) are controlling. To 
eliminate this inconsistency, and to put individual defendants on equal footing with 
corporate defendants, $ 1400(b) should be repealed. 
86. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
87. 28 U.S.C. $ 1404(a) (1988); see also Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62, 65 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a case may only be transferred where it could have 
originally been brought); Price v. Code-Alarm, Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9620 at  *8 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying a motion to transfer because Code- 
Alarm failed to show that venue would be proper in the transferee court); 
Farberware Inc. v. Alternative Pioneering Sys., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying defendant's contingent motion to transfer because defen- 
dant did not show by clear and convincing evidence that convenience of the parties 
warranted a transfer). But see Waldrop, supra note 84, at  55. Waldrop feels that 
saving judicial time is unlikely if $ 1400(b) is repealed. Id. Waldrop also notes that 
patent holders usually receive preference in transfer motions which will ultimately 
hurt the system because patent holders would be able to sue in more forums fa- 
vorable to them with the repeal of $ 14006) and have preferential treatment in 
venue transfers. Id. at 52. Alleged infringers do not have the same advantage. Id. 
at  53. 
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tions and fails to address non-corporate defendants. 
Although the amendment of 5 1391(c) brought complete 
uniformity with respect t o  corporations involved in patent in- 
fringement suits, the change is less significant when compared 
to the scope of the former patent venue statute as applied to 
corporate defendants. New forums for proper venue may now 
be obtained wherever personal jurisdiction exists at the com- 
mencement of the action. However, because personal jurisdic- 
tion was already proper under the old statute in either the 
state of incorporation or where the company had a regular and 
established place of business, the new amendment does not 
drastically increase the number of new forums available. 
However, the amendment eliminates wasteful collateral 
litigation over what constitutes a "regular and established 
place of business." Previously, plaintiffs in many cases were re- 
quired to  prove a "regular and established place of business" in 
order to obtain proper venue over a corporate defendant. Even 
though the litigation over venue is eliminated under the new 
statute, the collateral litigation will continue in many cases. 
Instead of litigation concerning proper venue, litigation will 
now shift to  a battle over personal jurisdiction, an issue not of- 
ten previously contested. It is arguable that such a shift may 
be an improvement because of well-established Supreme Court 
precedent for personal jurisdiction. Even so, problems may still 
remain because the amendment only deals with corporations 
and lower courts are confused about how t o  correctly apply the 
statute as required in VE Holding. 
As this note suggests, repealing 5 1400(b) would resolve 
these problems. All patent cases would be identical to other 
civil cases for venue purposes; judicial economy would be pro- 
moted because collateral litigation over the proper forum would 
be reduced; and lower courts would have clear directions to 
follow. 
Darin J. Gibby 
